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The phenomenon of interlocking directorates is widespread among corporate across the world. This 
paper studies the structure and extent of interlocking directorates within Indian business groups and 
analyses the performance effects of such i nterlocks. It finds that large groups tend to have more 
interlocks and more heterogeneous the group is, lesser are the interlocks. Finance and trading 
companies are seen to have a higher intensity of interlocks and holding companies occupy important 
nodes  in the directorial network. The paper also shows that directorial interlocks improve the 
performance of group-affiliated firms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The phenomenon of interlocking of corporate directorates is common in developed as well as 
developing countries. Such  interlocking is a situation where the same person occupies 
positions on the boards of more than one company. This phenomenon has historically 
received considerable attention in economics as well as in sociology. Different issues related 
to interlocks such as its effect on CEO-board relationships (Gulati and Westphal, 1999), its 
role in determining the effective independence of outside directors (Carpenter and Westphal, 
1999), its effect on the formation of collusions and determining strategic behaviour (Gulati  et 
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al.  2000), and its role in information sharing and corporate acquisitions (Haumschild and 
Beckman, 1998), have been studied. Given that all these aspects related to interlocking have 
important implications for the structure and effective functioning of company boards, which 
in turn have an important role to play in corporate governance and company performance 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2000), the issue of interlocking assumes significant importance. 
The objective of this paper is to look at the incidence of interlocking directorates in Indian 
business groups and to examine the effects of such interlocking on the performance of group 
affiliated companies. To my knowledge, this would be the first systematic study of 
interlocking directorates in Indian business groups and among the very few studies that exist 
with respect to developing and emerging economies [Lincoln et al. (1992), Keister (1998), 
Khanna and Rivkin (2000)]. Additionally, an important contribution of this study is that 
unlike earlier studies that have examined the effect of just the incidence of interlocks on 
company performance, my study goes a step further and estimates the relationship between 
performance and  magnitude of interlock intensity. In the process, I have developed several 
measures of the magnitude of directorial interlocks for groups and companies. 
 The phenomenon of interlocking directorates is particularly relevant for business groups. 
Business groups are sets of companies that are most often under common ownership and 
management but in most cases, retain separate legal identities of their own. Under such a set 
up, there exist dense networks of all kinds of intercorporate ties among affiliated firms 
belonging to the same business group [for examples, see Granovetter (1995), Khanna and 
Palepu (2000) and Kali (1999)]. One such source of ties is in the form of interlocking 
directorates. With business groups being h istorically a dominant form of organization in India 
and interlocking being an inherent characteristic of such groups (See Mehta, 1955), these 
become natural candidates for the analysis of interlocking directorates.  
A review of the existing theoretical and empirical literature on interlocking directorates 
reveals that there is a range of views with regard to the extent to which interlocking matters in   3
company performance. Following Koening,  et al.  (1979), one can identify four specific 
models, all of which outline how interlocking impacts on the performance of companies. On 
one extreme, the  management control model downplays the role of board interlocks and other 
board structures and emphasises that managers take the most important decisions and as such, 
are unaffected by the opinions of the board. The  reciprocity model works when two or more 
firms cooperate on a matter of mutual interest with Interlocking of directorates being one of 
the ways in which this reciprocity is brought about. The proponents of the  finance control 
model postulate that contrary to the Berle and Means (1932) paradigm of the independent firm 
that relies more on its own capacity to grow and evolve, firms depend on a dense network of 
intercorporate ties, especially with financial institutions as they are the principal providers of 
finance. Finally, the  class hegemony model proposes that interlocking directorates are more a 
means of ensuring inter-organisational elite co-opitation and co-operation (Patrick, 1974) than 
anything else and are thereby, “socially embedded” (Granovetter, 1985). Along with these 
models, the other two primary motives for interlocking documented in the literature are the 
information exchange motive and the  control motive. The former refers to the sharing of 
important information relating to new policies, trade secrets and practices among firms that 
are parties to the interlock, that could lead to better performance (see, for example, 
Haumschild and Beckman, 1998). The control motive, on the other hand, points to the 
existence of interlocks as a controlling device.  
The majority of the research on interlocking directorates has been with respect to developed 
countries like US, Japan, Germany, Belgium. The studies for the US have pointed to a  city-
based network of interlocking. [Koening,  et. al. (1979), Allen (1974)], being partially 
consistent with the class hegemony model. Some other studies have found a decline of 
interlocking over time (Dooley, 1969), although Allen (1974) in support of the finance control 
model, finds an increase in the extent of financial interlocks maintained by non-financial 
firms. In the case of Japan, Lincoln,  et. al.(1992) obtain a positive relation between interlocks 
and firm performance for Japanese Keiretsus.     4
The work done on interlocking f or developing and emerging economies has mainly been in 
the context of business groups. For companies belonging to Chinese groups, Keister (1998) 
shows a positive relationship between interlocks and firm performance and finds that 
information sharing was t he prime mover behind directorial interlocks. Khanna and Rivkin’s 
(2000) study on Chile has shown that if two companies have interlocking directorates, then 
the likelihood of them belonging to the same business group is larger.    
Although India is an emerging economy and despite the predominance of large business 
houses in its corporate sector, not much rigorous and systematic work exists as of now that 
studies the extent and incidence of directorial interlocks in Indian business groups and its 
possible impact on company performance. The only exception in this regard is a study in the 
fifties (Mehta, 1955), which examined interlocking at the time when managing agency system 
was prevalent and there was a dearth of managerial talent. Over the years, notwithstanding 
important institutional and economic changes, the importance of ties among group-affiliated 
firms such as directorial interlocks have continued to persist and retain its relevance (for 
example, see Khanna and Palepu 1999). Also, with the onset of globalisation in recent years, 
as corporate reform initiatives have gained momentum, the role of the board of directors and 
the issue of directorial interlocks have started receiving renewed attention [see for example, 
the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee Report (Birla, 2000) and the CII Report on Corporate 
Governance (CII, 1998)]. It is in this context that the present study becomes particularly 
relevant.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section lays out the data and 
methodology. In the third section, I portray the nature and extent of directorial interlocks in 
Indian business groups. The fourth section presents the estimation results showing the 
performance effects of interlocks and discusses the results. The fifth section concludes. A ll 
the tables and figures referred to in this paper are collected in the appendix. 
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2.DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
My primary data source is the Prowess Database  produced and maintained by the Centre 
for Monitoring Indian Economy Private Limited and it contains firm level information on 
various characteristics such as financial and performance variables, information relating to 
ownership groups, constitution of boards of directors, industry classifications, etc. The period 
for which the data has been taken is 1999-2000. The sample chosen for my analysis consists 
of companies belonging to the Top 50 business houses. Data on boards of directors as well as 
other firm level information was compiled as they stood at the end of March 2000. 
In generating the dataset on directorial interlocks, a list was first prepared for the companies 
belonging to each of the Top 50 business houses, which totalled 895 companies. Some 
business houses that had undergone splits or had functional subgroupings but listed in 
Prowess as intact were also taken care of by listing the subgroups as separate groups, thereby 
obtaining 89 business groups. In many of the cases, the initials of the directors were given in 
Prowess instead of the full names. In these cases, the full names were obtained by making 
personal telephonic calls to the company head offices and from the company websites.  
After generating the data on director names and company affiliations, I took the names of all 
these companies group-wise and counted the number of times each name occurred inside each 
of the groups. Using this data, I calculate three measures of directorial interlocks, namely (i) 
Group_interlock, (ii) Co_interlock, (iii) Normal_interlock. 
These measures are calculated in the following manner. Let a business group Gi have  n(Gi) 
companies in it denoted by j = 1,2…n(Gi). Let the jth company  (j  ˛ G i) have  Dj directorial 
positions in it. Let the number of directors occupying positions on the boards of all the 
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Co_interlock or the company-wise measure of interlocks is calculated in the following 
manner. Let the persons occupying directorial positions on the board of the jth company be 
denoted by M
j
k (k = 1,2…Dj). Let us assume that the  k
th person also occupies positions on the 




From these two measures, I derive the following proposition: 
Proposition:  The probability of a company j [ j˛ G i, j=1,2…n(Gi)] belonging to a business 
group G i, being interlocked with other companies in the group  (k ˛ G i, k =1,2…n(Gi); k „ j) 
is weakly increasing in the size of its board of directors when the group size remains fixed 
and it is weakly increasing in the group size when the board size remains fixed.
1  
From the proposition, it becomes evident that Co-interlock depends on board size and group 
size. To correct for this dependence, I normalise this measure by the board size and group 
size. This normalised measure Normal_interlock is calculated as follows:  
Theoretically,  0 <  (Group_interlock)i  £  1. The extent of directorial interlocks within the 
group  Gi declines as the magnitude of  (Group_interlock)i increases. The second measure 
satisfies the condition  0  £  (Co_interlock)j  £  Dj[n(Gi)  –1] and its value increases as the 
number of directorial interlocks of company  j rises. It should be noted that the measure 
Normal_interlock measures the intensity of interlocks, lies between 0 and 1 and increases as 
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the intensity of interlocks rises. The final m easure is the one that I use in the regression 
analysis
2. 
3. INCIDENCE OF DIRECTORIAL INTERLOCKS  
This section examines in detail the incidence of directorial interlocks and brings out some 
basic features exhibited by interlocking directorates in Indian business groups. Tables 2 and 3 
and Figures 1 and 2 summarise the basic findings with respect to company interlocks, board 
size and group size and group interlocks, group size and group diversification. The weighted 
averages in the tables are computed by using the number of companies in the groups as a 
proportion of the total number of companies in the size class as weights. Several interesting 
facts are evident from the tables. The magnitude of the Co_interlock measure increases as the 
board size and group s ize rise. This is demonstrated by an increase in the  Co_interlock 
variable as one moves down Table 2 towards higher size classes. These two findings are in 
line with the proposition of Section 2.  
Table 3 points to some other interesting facts. It shows that the extent of interlocks within 
groups increases as the group size rises. This is demonstrated by the fact that as one moves 
towards higher size classes, the value of the  Group_interlock variable declines. It should be 
noted that in the way the variable  Group_interlock is defined, a decline in the value of 
Group_interlock implies an increase in the extent of interlocks. The other interesting result 
from this table concerns the relationship between group heterogeneity and group interlock. 
For each of the  business groups in my sample, the heterogeneity is computed by dividing the 
number of distinct two digit-industry classifications (by Prowess) by the group size and I call 
this measure as G_Het. It is obvious that this value lies between zero and one and 
heterogeneity of the group increases with an increase in the value of the number. It can be 
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each of the nodes of the graph that has the companies as the nodes and the interlock ties as the links. 
Each business group is conceived as a graph in this framework. However, in this paper, the direction of 
the ties could not be ascertained (i.e., the  In-degree  and  Out-degree could not be separated out because   8
seen from Table 3 that as the heterogeneity of the group rises, the value of the variable 
Group_interlock increases, indicating a decline in the extent of interlocks within the group. 
This is an interesting finding in the sense that it points to the existence of “related industry 
interlocks”, with possible synergy effects from specialisation, thereby activating the 
information-sharing motive  
To analyse whether interlocks are more in companies having a particular line of business, I 
classified companies as finance companies, trading companies and others. I then ranked 
companies within each business group according to the values of  Normal_interlock  in a 
descending order and looked at the activities of the first three companies in the ranking for 
each of the groups. The results are shown in Table 4.  
It is evident from the table that the number of business groups in which at least one finance 
company figured among the top 3 is the highest. The number of business groups in which at 
least one trading company figured among the first three companies is also quite large. 
Interestingly, in all except for 6 business houses, all the finance and trading companies among 
the first three companies belonging to each business group had boards of directors that were 
relatively small. In fact, but for these 6 cases, all the finance and trading companies have 
board sizes that are smaller than the mean board sizes for the groups. Thus, the high values of 
Co_interlock for these companies is more a result of higher interlocks that the board members 
maintain with other group companies than a result of large board size. This is an indication of 
interlocks being used primarily for control purposes because finance companies are in charge 
of financing the group companies and the more important persons (persons occupying 
positions on a large number of boards) sit on the boards of these companies. Many a times, 
the finance companies are also the holding companies of the respective groups and hence 
important members sit on their boards, so that they can retain control of the other group 
companies through the provision of finances. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
the decomposition of the board into inside and outside directors or executive and non-executive was 
not available for most companies in the sample.   9
The possible reason that trading companies feature high in the list is that in many cases, they 
were also among the oldest companies in the group. By virtue of being among the oldest as 
well as the holding companies of the groups in some cases, the more important persons 
including the family members and promoters occupied positions in their boards.  
An analysis was also carried out to study the relationship between the age of the business 
house and the value of the  Group_interlock  variable for the group  (Table 5).  For this I have 
taken the age of the oldest company of the group as a proxy to measure the age of the 
business group. It was expected that older groups would be having greater extent of interlocks 
because of the strong foothold that they had created for themselves and since family control 
was expected to be more predominant for older groups. The results do not, however, support 
this. The table as also the scatter plot in Figure 3 show that there is no systematic pattern 
between the age of the group and the value of Group_interlock. Thus, interlock ties seem to 
be ubiquitous in business groups, old or new. 
Another interesting feature of business groups in India as well as abroad is the presence of a 
holding company. A holding company is one that owns more than 50% of the stocks of the 
other group companies. It is through  these holding companies that the promoters in most of 
the cases exercise control over the other group companies. It is expected that in most of the 
cases, the more important family members and close associates of the family members will be 
sitting on the b oards of the holding companies. Thus, it is also expected that the holding 
companies in any group would be interlocked with other group companies via directorial ties. 
For exposition purposes, I have considered the interlocking pattern of the holding company of 
the Tata Group, Tata Sons Ltd. and the picture is presented in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 shows the interlock structure of the holding company of the Tata Group, Tata Sons 
Ltd. with eighteen directors on its board, with other group companies. In the figure, each of 
the lines connecting Tata Sons Ltd. to the other group companies depicts one common 
director between the two companies. The other common directorships between the other   10 
companies are not shown in the figure in order to prevent the figure from getting cluttered. 
The pattern that emerges follows the expected lines. We find a dense network of interlocks. 
However, this seems to be the pattern for older groups and larger groups because the 
entrenchment motive is likely to be stronger for them than for smaller and newer groups. 
4. PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF DIRECTORIAL INTERLOCKS 
This section presents an econometric estimation of the performance effects of interlocks with 
respect to the sample of group-affiliated companies chosen for this study.   
4.1 The Model and Variables 
For the estimation, I conduct the analysis by regressing company performance on a variable 
measuring the extent of interlocks, controlling for other factors that may influence 
performance. As stated in Section 2, I use the normalised measure of interlock, 
Normal_interlock (denoted by N_LOCK) as my variable of interest to measure the magnitude 
and intensity of company-wise directorial interlocks. The measure of performance that has 
been used in the analysis is the Return On Assets (ROA) for the year ending March 2000. 
The standard way in which performance has been measured in the literature on interlocks is 
productivity per worker. However, I take ROA as a measure of company performance as has 
been used in some other studies [Khanna and Palepu (1999)]. ROA is defined as (Profits 
before interest and taxes net of non recurrent expenditures/Total Assets) and calculated with 
Profits before tax and interest because in India, the tax treatment is not uniform across 
companies and non-recurrent expenditure has been deducted from it because the accounting 
procedures followed are also non uniform. Market based measures such as Tobin’s Q and 
Market to Book Value Ratio have not been used because these figures are available only for 
listed companies. Since b usiness groups contain a large number of unlisted companies as 
well, usage of these measures would have meant a drastic reduction in the number of 
observations and hence, would have given rise to problems of interpretation, more so because   11 
many of the unlisted companies within the groups consist of trading and finance companies 
that have a high degree of directorial interlocks. 
Given that several other company characteristics can also affect performance, I consider a 
host of control variables in the estimation. The control variables used are log of sales 
(LSALES), age of the company (AGE), export intensity (EXPINT), depreciation intensity 
(DEPINT), R&D intensity (RDINT), advertising intensity (ADVINT), leverage (LEVG), 
proportion of loans from other group companies (LO_GR), heterogeneity of the group to 
which the company belongs (G_HET), industry dummies (IND1…IND20), a dummy to 
indicate if the company is diversified or not (DIV) and a dummy to indicate a finance 
company (FINANCE). A dummy variable is taken to indicate listed companies (LIST), and to 
control for the fact that many listed companies are not frequently traded and hence may not be 
subject to external market pressures in a significant way, I have taken the relative number of 
days on which the stocks of the companies had traded on the Bombay Stock Exchange and 
interacted with the LIST dummy to obtain a measure of effective listing (EFFLIST). The 
descriptions of the control variables are in the appendix.  
It is likely that the companies that belong to a business group would be having some common 
elements, many of which would be unobserved. Ordinary Least Squares with a classical error 
structure cannot be used to capture this effect.  In fact, as Moulton (1986) has pointed out, 
using OLS when group specific effects are present would result in low standard errors of the 
estimates, giving rise to the rejection of the null hypothesis, which would point to the 
presence of a significant relationship when no such relationship actually exists. Because of the 
presence of some variables that remain invariant across all firms in a group, a fixed effects 
model could not be used. So, I have used a random effects model. For the i
th company in the 
j
th group, the model is given as:   
  (ROA) ij = b0 + bI (N_LOCK) ij + X¢d + v ij                                                 (4) 
 
The error structure of the model is the following.    12 
vij = uij + e j  with u ij ~ N(0, su
2),  ej ~ N(0, se
2);  
Cov (uij, u kl) = su
2, if i = k and j = l. and 0 otherwise;  
Cov (ej, el) = se
2, if j = l and 0, otherwise;  
Cov (uij, X p) = Cov (e j, X p) = Cov (uij, e j) = 0 " p, i and j. 
Here, (ROA)ij is the Return On Assets of the  i
th company in the  j
th business group as it stood 
at the end of March, 2000 and (N_LOCK) ij is the normalised measure of interlock of the  i
th 
firm in the  j
th group; X is a matrix of observations on the control variables and b0, b1 and d are 
the coefficients to be estimated. The error term v ij incorporates the fact that companies within 
a group are correlated but the correlation across groups is zero. Observations on all the 
relevant variables could be obtained for 608 firms on which the regression was based. 
4.2 Results and Discussion 
The summary statistics are presented in Table 6 and the results are summarised in the first 
panel of Table 7. The first observation is that the coefficient of N_LOCK, 0.092 is significant 
at the 10% level and positive and thus, it implies a positive and significant effect of interlocks 
on performance. The more intensely the directors of a company are interlocked with other 
group companies, the better the company is seen to be performing in terms of the ROA. 
Hence, my results point to the fact that the negative effects of interlocks in terms of 
entrenchment and crony capitalism, if at all they exist, are o utweighed by the gains from 
information sharing and better governance, giving rise to a positive net effect. This result is in 
line with earlier results obtained by Keister (1998) and Lincoln, et. al.(1992) for Chinese and 
Japanese business groups respectively.  
With respect to the signs of the coefficients of the control variables, several interesting results 
are evident from the regression. We see that LIST has a negative and insignificant coefficient 
and so does EFFLIST, which shows that widely held, listed companies that are subjected to 
(A.1)   13 
the market forces are not, after all, doing a better job of governance and that closely held 
group-affiliated companies seem to be faring better.  
Among the other variables, LSALES has a highly positive and significant e ffect on 
performance, showing that larger firms generally perform better than smaller ones. G_HET, 
on the other hand, is seen to have a negative and significant effect on firm performance, 
showing that firms belonging to less diverse groups perform better than those belonging to the 
more diversified ones. This also supports the present endeavour of many Indian groups to 
shed many of their non-core businesses and move onto a more focused strategy. 
Among the industry dummies, FINANCE is seen to be highly positively significant. Among 
the other industries, IND2 has a negative and significant effect on the ROA, indicating that 
companies belonging to agro-based industries performed worse than others and so did 
companies belonging to the textile industry (indicated by the negative and significant 
coefficient of IND6); IND16 has a positive and significant coefficient, indicating a higher 
ROA for companies in the electronics industry.  
In the analysis undertaken so far, it has been borne out that the intensity of directorial 
interlocks has a positive and significant effect on firm performance. But, one also needs to 
consider the other two effects of interlocks that may be having a negative effect on firm 
performance.  These two are the  decreasing returns to scale  effect and the  entrenchment 
effect. The first effect is activated when a director holds positions in “more companies than he 
can handle”, thereby affecting performance adversely. The other effect works when the 
interlocking is a result of placing family members and friends on the boards of directors of 
multiple companies without any consideration whatsoever for the efficiencies and capabilities 
of the concerned people, giving rise to “crony capitalism”. This does not have the desired 
positive effects on company performance. Taking into account these two effects, it was 
expected that till a certain value of the interlock intensity, performance of companies would 
increase with increases in the intensity of interlocks, beyond which the negative effects would   14 
start  outweighing the positive ones, bringing about a decline in firm performance with 
successive increases in the intensity of directorial interlocks.  
In order to test for the presence of these effects in the context of Indian business groups, I 
incorporated a quadratic term for N_LOCK in the random effects model given by equation (4) 
along with N_LOCK to examine the presence of any turning points in the interlock intensity – 
performance relationship. The regression results for the other variables were the same as they 
had been in the earlier regression but, the coefficients of N_LOCK and (N_LOCK)
2 turned 
out to be insignificant, thereby negating the existence of turning points in the relationship. 
The relationship, in fact, had a turning point in the N_LOCK < 0 range and as such, was not 
relevant for my study because in my analysis, 0 £ N_LOCK  £ 1. I had also tried to determine 
the turning points endogenously by employing a spline regression technique. I carried out the 
analysis using two spline variables created on N_LOCK. The results, once again, pointed out 
the insignificance of the spline variables, thereby ruling out the existence of turning points for 
our sample. Thus, we find that in the present context, the positive effects of directorial 
interlocks outweigh the negative ones, giving rise to a positive relationship for our sample of 
companies.  
Till now, the analysis had been carried out under the assumption that in the random effects 
model, the companies belonging to the same group would be having some commonality 
which would be captured by the error variance- covariance structure shown in (A.1). Under 
this structure, however, the underlying assumption was that the non-zero covariances between 
the errors of firms belonging to a group would remain the same  for all the groups. This, 
however, may not be a valid assumption. Because it is but natural to think that different 
groups would be having different degrees of cohesion among the companies in the group and 
as such, the covariances are likely to be different. That makes it necessary to fit a Random 
Effects Model with  groupwise heteroscedasticity in this context. The model for the  i
th 
company in the j
th group will be:   15 
   (ROA)ij = b0 + bI (N_LOCK) ij + X¢d + vij                                                 (5) 
 
The error structure of the model is the following.  
vij = uij + e j  with u ij ~ N(0, su
2),  ej ~ N(0, sej
2);  
Cov (uij, u kl) = su
2, if i = k and j = l. and 0 otherwise;  
Cov (ej, el) = sej
2, if j = l and 0, otherwise;  
Cov (uij, X p) = Cov (e j, X p) = Cov (uij, e j) = 0 " p, i and j. 
Here, again, (ROA) ij is the Return On Assets of the i
th company in the j
th business group as it 
stood at the end of March, 2000 and (N_LOCK)ij is the normalized measure of interlock of 
the i
th firm in the j
th group; X is a matrix of observations on the control variables and  b0, b1 
and  d are the coefficients to be estimated. The error term v ij incorporates the fact that 
companies within a group are correlated but the correlation across groups is zero. However, in 
this case, Cov (ej, e l) = sej
2, if j = l and 0, otherwise (and not se
2 as was the case in equation 
4). The model thus incorporates the presence of groupwise heteroscedasticity. Although the 
specification suggested by Moulton (1986) had been used in the context of business groups by 
Khanna and Palepu (1999), they did not use a model incorporating groupwise 
heteroscedasticity, which needs to be incorporated in order to analyse business groups. 
 The results of the model with groupwise heteroscedasticity are shown in the second panel of 
Table 7. The first thing to be noticed in this table is that the coefficient of N_LOCK in this 
model has increased to 0.1047 and the value of the t -ratio has increased from 1.685 in the 
model without heteroscedasticity to 1.7, indicating an increase in the significance of the 
coefficient. This shows that when different group-specific effects are incorporated in the 
model, interlock intensity explains performance better than in the earlier case. This maybe 
because of the fact that the extent to which interlock intensity affects company performance 
depends also on the differences in the other group characteristics, which are captured in the 
random effects model with groupwise heteroscedasticity. 
(A.2)   16 
The conclusions regarding the signs and significance of the other variables more or less 
remain the same in this model. The first major observation is that the variable EFFLIST 
becomes negatively significant at the 10% level in this case. It had a negative effect earlier 
but was not significant in explaining company performance. The other interesting result is that 
the variable G_HET loses its significance in the present model, probably because a part of the 
heterogeneity of the groups (in terms of the industry classifications of the companies 
belonging to t he groups) has already been incorporated in the model via the error structure 
given by (A.2). The other variable to lose significance is EXPINT, although it retains its sign. 
Among the industry dummies, IND2 and IND16 lose their significance but retain the signs. 
On the other hand, IND5 (denoting the food/beverage/tobacco industry) becomes negatively 
significant at the 10% level, IND7 (denoting the leather industry) becomes positively 
significant at the 10% level and IND12 (denoting non-metallic mineral products) becomes 
negatively significant at the 10% level.  
To summarise, we see that directorial interlocks do have a positive effect on firm performance 
in Indian business groups for both the models. The exact channel of the improved 
performance cannot, however, be assessed from the analysis. It can be due to better 
information sharing between the group affiliated companies and better governance exercised 
by the system of interlocking directorates.  The analysis of the exact channel can form 
possible areas of extension of this study. 
5. CONCLUSION 
It has been shown that the extent of interlocking within 89 Indian business groups is quite 
substantial. Larger groups had more interlocking than smaller ones and more heterogonous 
groups had less of interlocking, p ointing to the existence of related industry interlocks. The 
relative importance of finance companies and trading companies in the intragroup directorial 
network is also noticed.   17 
The primary results do not seem to find support for the  management control model that had 
been described at the beginning of the paper.  The raw data had shown that in many of the 
family business groups, most of the positions on the boards are occupied either by family 
members or other relatives and friends. This is more so in case of the holding companies and 
finance companies of the groups and those are the companies that dictate the activities of 
many of the other group companies and also provide them with finance. Generally speaking, 
the era of the management deciding on most important matters has not yet arrived for many of 
the family business groups and board structure and board members still have a significant role 
to play. 
The paper, however, finds partial support both for the reciprocity model as well as the finance 
control model. Within many of the groups, board members are seen to occupy positions on 
boards on a reciprocal basis. The most interesting manifestation of this phenomenon occurs in 
the case of family groups that have split during inter-generational transfers or o therwise and 
as such, have fragmented into independent subgroups. In these cases, it may be interesting to 
note that many board members continue to occupy reciprocal positions across the subgroups 
even after the split. This maybe a pointer to some kind of a tacit understanding between the 
subgroups. Also, the fact that in many of the cases, the group companies have a significant 
level of interlocks with the finance companies and holding companies of the groups indicates 
the existence of some variation of the finance control model.  
The raw data also points to the existence of some variation of the class hegemony model in 
some of the family business groups. Although the city-based or region-based nature of 
interlocks have not been analysed, it has been noticed that in some of the older family groups, 
many of the directorial interlocks among the group companies have been caused by members 
belonging to the same traditional castes as the promoters or belong to the same region as the 
promoters’ family. This particular phenomenon has its roots in the origin of the trading 
communities in India and their conversion into the entrepreneurial class and as such, is more 
of a historical or sociological phenomenon.   18 
The paper finds that both the  information exchange and the control motive  are operational in 
case of directorial interlocks in Indian business groups. The existence of a large number of 
interlocks of group companies with the holding companies of the groups in many cases 
suggests the importance of holding companies in the directorial network. The holding 
companies generally have the promoters and family members occupying important positions 
on the boards and high level of interlocks they have with other group companies suggests the 
existence of the  control motive behind the existence of these interlocks. On the other hand, the 
existence of  related industry interlocks  signifies the existence of the  information exchange 
motive as the driving force behind these interlocks. The relative magnitudes of these two 
motives however, remain unexamined in this paper.  
The paper has also shown that the intensity of interlocks affects company performance 
positively, which is in confirmation with the studies of interlocking and performance for 
countries like China and Japan. The interesting feature of this particular effect is that 
interlocks affect performance positively in a uniform manner; the advantages gained from 
interlocks are seen to offset the negative impact of them at any stage, thereby suggesting that 
these informal “ties that bind business groups” do have a role to play even now in case of 
Indian business groups. 
The current work can be extended in several directions. It has not considered the direction of 
the network ties due to inadequate data. One can differentiate the interlocks as those between 
family members and those created by professional members and analyse the relative 
importance of these two types of interlocks. How interlocks fare  vis-à-vis other types of inter-
firm ties such as cross holding of shares can be  another interesting line of analysis. 
Performance may also affect interlocks, which may induce endogeneity into the mode. These 





   19 
REFERENCES 
 
Allen, Michale Patrick  (1974), “The Structure of Interorganizational Elite Co-operation: 
Interlocking Corporate Directorates,”  American Sociological Review, 39 (June), pages 393-
406. 
 
Berle, A. and G. Means (1932), The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York, 
MacMillan. 
 
Birla, Kumar Mangalam (2000), The Draft Report of the Committee Appointed by the SEBI 
on Corporate Governance under the Chairmanship of Shri Kumar Mangalam Birla 
 
Carpenter, James and James Westphal  (1999),  A Network Perspective on How Outside 
Directors Impact Strategic Decision Making,. Forthcoming in the  Academy of Management 
Journal. 
 
CII (1998),  Desirable Corporate Governance: A Code, Confederation of Indian Industry 
(CII), New Delhi. 
. 
Dooley, Peter C. (1969), “The Interlocking Directorate,”  American Economic Review, 59 
(June), pages 314-323 
.   
Granovetter, Mark S . (1985), “Economic Actions and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness”, American Journal of Sociology, 91(3), pages 481-510. 
 
___________________(1985), “Coase Revisited:  Business Groups in the Modern Economy” 
Industrial-and-Corporate-Change; 4(1), pages 93-130 
 
Gulati, Ranjay and James Westphal (1999) “The Dark Side of Embeddedness: An 
Examination of the influence of direct and indirect board interlocks and CEO/Board 
relationships on interfirm alliances." Administrative Science Quarterly, 1999, 44: 473-506. 
 
Gulati, Ranjay, Nitin Nohria and Akbar Zaheer  (2000), “Strategic Networks”, Strategic 
Management Journal, 21 pages 203-215. 
 
Haumschild, P. and C.M. Beckman (1998), "When do Interlocks matter? Alternate Sources 
of Information and Interlock Influence," Administrative Science Quarterly, 43, pages 815-844 
 
Hermalin, Benjamin E. and Michael S. Weisbach  (2000),  Boards of Directors as 
Endogenously Determined Institutions: A Survey of the Economic Literature, Working Paper, 
June 15, 2000. 
 
Kali, Raja (1999) “Endogenous Business Networks” Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organization, 15 (3) pages 615-636. 
 
Keister, Lisa A . (1998), “Engineering Growth: Business Group Structure and Firm 
Performance in China’s Transition Economy,”  American Journal of Sociology, 104 (2), pages 
404-440. 
 
Khanna, Tarun and Jan W. Rivkin (2000), Ties that bind Business Groups: Evidence from 
an Emerging Economy, Working Paper, August 9, 2000. 
   20 
Khanna. Tarun and Krishna Palepu (2000), “Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging 
Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups,”  Journal of Finance; 55(2), 
pages 867-91  
 
_________________________________(1999), “Policy Shocks, Market Intermediaries, and 
Corporate Strategy: The Evolution of Business Groups in Chile and India”,  Journal of 
Economics and Management Strategy; 8(2), summer 1999, pages 271-310. 
 
Koenig, Thomas, Robert Gogel and John Sonquist (1979), “Models of the Significance of 
Interlocking Corporate Directorates,”  American Journal of E conomics and Sociology, 38 (2), 
pages 173-186. 
 
Lincoln, J. R., M.L. Gerlach and P. Takahashi (1992), “Keretsu Networks in the Japanese 
Economy: A Dyad Analysis of Intercorporate Ties,”  American Sociological Review, 57, pages 
561-585. 
 
Mehta, M. M. (1955), The Structure of Indian Industries,  Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 
1984. 
 
Mizruchi, Mark (1996), "What Do Interlocks Do? An Analysis, Critique, and Assessment of  
Research on Interlocking Directorates." Annual Review of Sociology, 22, pages 271-98. 
 
Moulton, Brent (1986) “Random Group Effects and the Precision of Regression Estimates”. 






























   21 
APPENDIX 
Description of the Control Variables 
LEVG is defined as the ratio of long-term debt to t otal equity and reserves. This variable 
captures the effect of corporate tax shields. 
LSALES refers to the logarithm of sales. This variable reflects the unobserved factors that are 
related to the size of the company. 
EXPINT refers to the export intensity  of firms. It captures the effect of exposure to 
international competition. 
ADVINT refers to the advertisement intensity of the firm. It is measured as the ratio of 
advertisement expenditure to total sales. It captures the effect of intangible assets. 
DEPINT is the depreciation intensity of the firm. It is measured by the ratio of depreciation 
expenditure to total sales. It is a proxy for the capital intensity of the firm. More the value of 
DEPINT, higher the capital intensity of the company. 
RDINT is the research and development intensity, being measured as the ratio of total R&D 
expenditure to total sales. It is incorporated to capture the effects of R&D on performance. 
LO_GR is the proportion of loans obtained by the company from other group companies. This 
is incorporated to measure the extent of inter-firm ties within a group. 
G_HET is a measure of group diversity, being defined as the ratio of the number of distinct 
two-digit classification within the group to the number of firms in the group. Higher values of 
the variable indicate greater diversity.  
INDi is an industry dummy for the ith industry. It takes a value of 1 for companies belonging 
to the ith industry and 0 otherwise. 
FINANCE is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the company in question is a  finance 
company and 0 otherwise. This has been taken to capture the special nature of finance 
companies. 
DIV is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the company is a diversified and 0 otherwise. A 
diversified company imperfectly distributes the product-specific risk on performance.  
LIST is a dummy taking the value of 1 for listed companies and zero otherwise. 
EFFLIST is the interaction term between LIST and the relative number of trading days. 
 
TABLE 1: PERCENTAGE OF ASSETS HELD BY THE TOP 50 INDIAN 
BUSINESS GROUP AMONG ALL INDIAN BUSINESS GROUPS OVER THE 
YEARS 
 
Data Source: Economic Intelligence Service. Corporate Sector. May 1999. CMIE. P. 
 

























 TABLE 2: COMPANY INTERLOCKS, GROUP SIZE AND BOARD SIZE 
 






Average  Weighted AverageMaximum Minimum Average   Weighted 
Average  Maximum Minimum 
1 – 5  27  7.802  7.750  13.000  4.000  2.531  3.202  8.000  0.000 
6 - 10  31  7.854  7.794  11.833  5.000  7.628  7.712  16.286  6.000 
11 - 20  22  7.846  7.863  9.882  5.692  10.514  10.525  18.778  2.917 
21 - 50  6  6.645  6.730  8.071  5.077  11.269  11.971  20.357  5.364 
> 50  1  8.754  8.754  8.754  8.754  16.492  16.492  16.492  16.492 
 
 
TABLE 3; GROUP DIVERSIFICATION AND GROUP INTERLOCKS 
 
Group Heterogeneity (At the Two-digit Level of 
Industry Classification) 








Average  Maximum Minimum  Average   Weighted AverageMaximum Minimum 
1 – 5  27  0.769  0.738  1.000  0.333  0.877  0.845  1.000  0.667 
6 – 10  31  0.521  0.511  1.000  0.167  0.743  0.740  0.846  0.511 
11 – 20  22  0.419  0.423  0.615  0.091  0.708  0.711  0.862  0.573 
21 – 50  6  0.350  0.322  0.636  0.167  0.684  0.676  0.806  0.621 
> 50  1  0.230  0.230  0.230  0.230  0.648  0.648  0.648  0.648 
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TABLE 4: THE MAIN LINES OF ACTIVITIES OF COMPANIES HAVING 
THE HIGHEST INTENSITY OF INTERLOCKING WITHIN EACH 
BUSINESS HOUSE*  
 
Number of Business Groups 
having at least one finance 
company among the first three 
companies ranked by "intensity 
of interlocking" 
Number of Business 
Groups having at least one 
trading company among 
the first three companies 
ranked by "intensity of 
interlocking" 
Number of business groups 
having neither a finance company 
nor a trading company among the 
first three companies ranked 




















*The entries indicate the number of business houses., having the specified characteristic. The 
data has been obtained using the disaggregated data set that treats the split business houses 
and the functional subgroupings within business houses as separate groups. Finance 
companies and trading companies are those that have the following as their main line of 
activity: 
 
Finance Companies  Trading Companies 
Investment services  Trade in textiles 
Financial and leasing services  Trade in manufactured goods 
Equipment leasing services  Trade in electrical machinery 
Hire purchase finance services  Trade in beverages and tobacco 




TABLE 5: AGE OF THE BUSINESS GROUP AND EXTENT OF 
DIRECTORIAL INTERLOCKS 
 
Group_Interlock  Group Size  Age of the Oldest 
Company of the 





Average  Maximum  Minimum  Average  Maximum Minimum 
0 – 25  12  0.793  1.000  0.511  5.333  11  1 
26 – 50  19  0.782  1.000  0.531  7.368  18  1 
51 – 75  21  0.745  1.000  0.573  11.476  42  2 
76 – 100  21  0.786  1.000  0.621  10.522  26  1 
101 – 125  8  0.767  1.000  0.648  20.625  61  2 
126 – 150  4  0.697  0.761  0.642  10.750  17  6 
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TABLE 6: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE VARIABLES 
 
Variable  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
ROA  0.0755 0.1337 -0.6860 0.8192
N_LOCK  0.1139 0.1041 0.0000 0.6250
AGE  31.0510 24.3634 1.0000 137.0000
EXPINT  0.0954 0.1924 0.0000 1.0000
ADVINT  0.0078 0.0252 0.0000 0.2968
LEVG  1.6322 14.1230 -46.2634 329.2381
DEPINT  0.1306 0.9122 0.0000 20.0000
RDINT  0.0020 0.0064 0.0000 0.1000
LIST  0.5789 0.4941 0.0000 1.0000
EFFLIST  45.8838 44.6653 0.0000 100.0000
LSALES  4.1438 2.2320 -4.6052 9.9184
G_HET  0.4384 0.1827 0.0909 1.0000
LO_GR  0.0665 0.2086 0.0000 1.0000
 
 
TABLE 7: RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
 
Significance Levels: *1%, **5%, ***10% 
Variables Coefficient Coefficient
N_LOCK   0.0920 1.685 *** 0.1047 1.700 ***
AGE      -0.0008 -2.950 * -0.0008 -3.377 *
EXPINT   0.0510 1.873 *** 0.0414 1.573
ADVINT   0.2100 1.014 0.2019 0.980
LEVG     -0.0002 -0.837 -0.0002 -0.766
LSALES   0.0290 9.198 * 0.0350 10.972 *
DEPINT   -0.0040 -0.621 -0.0027 -0.458
RDINT    -0.8780 -1.049 -0.5682 -0.691
LIST     -0.0280 -1.292 -0.0261 -1.192
EFFLIST  -0.0003 -1.317 -0.0004 -1.701 ***
LO_GR    -0.0270 -1.006 -0.0074 -0.275
G_HET    -0.0790 -2.380 ** -0.0699 -1.509
IND2     0.0710 2.166 ** 0.0482 1.448
IND3     -0.0009 -0.006 0.0057 0.102
IND4     -0.0600 -1.055 -0.0456 -0.756
IND5     -0.0390 -1.005 -0.0678 -1.731 ***
IND6     -0.0560 -2.314 ** -0.0589 -2.249 **
IND7     0.1870 1.548 0.2121 1.801 ***
IND8     0.0620 0.509 0.0548 0.463
IND9     0.0030 0.074 -0.0083 -0.194
IND10    0.0160 0.698 0.0115 0.490
IND11    0.0190 0.697 0.0139 0.472
IND12    -0.0460 -1.479 -0.0555 -1.773 ***
IND13    -0.0220 -0.903 -0.0168 -0.667
IND14    0.0120 0.498 0.0157 0.637
IND15    -0.0140 -0.544 -0.0134 -0.503
IND16    0.0490 1.901 *** 0.0310 1.179
IND17    0.0310 1.272 0.0145 0.583
IND18    0.0140 0.237 0.0346 0.590
IND19    0.0240 0.565 0.0038 0.089
IND20    -0.0310 -0.624 -0.0596 -0.956
FINANCE  0.0600 2.218 * 0.0678 3.185 *
DIV      -0.0230 -0.754 -0.0285 -0.924
Constant 0.0200 0.829 -0.0176 -0.609
R-Squared 0.236 0.246
Regression with groupwise 
heteroscedasticity (Equation 5)
Regression without groupwise 
heteroscedasticity (Equation 4)





Scatter Plot of Age of the Business Group (as measured by the age of 
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FIGURE 4: INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES BETWEEN THE HOLDING COMPANY OF THE TATA GROUP (TATA SONS LTD.) AND THE OTHER 
COMPANIES OF THE GROUP 
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Proof of Proposition 
 
   Proposition: The probability of a company j [ j˛ G i, j=1,2…n(Gi)] belonging to a business 
group G i, being interlocked with other companies in the group  (k ˛ G i, k =1,2…n(Gi); k „ j) 
is weakly increasing in the size of its board of directors when the group size remains fixed 
and it is weakly increasing in the group size when the board size remains fixed.   
   Proof: Let a business group be defined as the set of the companies belonging to it 
and let us call this set as  G. From now onwards, the group will be referred to as G. 
Let the number of companies belonging to the group be N so that n(G) = N.  
   Let a typical company belonging to the group  G be denoted by  i  (i  ˛ G, i = 1,2…N). 
Let each of the companies belonging to the group have a board of directors. Let the 
set of persons occupying the board of directors of the  i
th company be Bi and let the 
number of members on the board of directors of the  i
th company be denoted by  Mi so 
that n(Bi) = Mi. Let a typical member on the board of directors of the i
th company be 
denoted by ik (k = 1,2…Mi). Let the event that the k
th member of the i
th board also sits 
on the board of another company  j (j ˛ G, j = 1,2…N, j„ i) be denoted by Eik,j ( i,j ˛ 
G and i „ j). The event that the kth member of the ith board sits only on the ith board 
and nowhere else will be denoted by  Eik,0. Then, the event that the  k
th member of the 
i
th  board sits on the board of at least another company  j (j ˛ G, j „ i) will be denoted 
by‘Eik,0.  
   After laying down the basic framework, there are certain assumptions that I have 
made. These can be listed down as follows: 
i.  The events  Eik,j and  Epr,q are independent of each other  " i  ˛ (1,2…N), p  ˛ 
(1,2…N), k ˛ (1,2…Mi), r ˛ (1,2…Mp), (j ˛ G but, j „ i) and (q ˛ G but q „ p). 
Also, it is not the case that i = p, k = r and j = q simultaneously.   28 
ii.  The events‘Eik,0 and‘Epr,0 are independent of each other  " i  ˛  (1,2…N), p ˛ 
(1,2…N), k ˛ (1,2…M i), r ˛ (1,2…Mp). Also, it is not the case that i = p, k = r  
simultaneously. 
iii.   The probability of the event Eik,j, P(Eik,j) = q " i ˛ (1,2…N), k ˛ (1,2…M i), and 
j˛ G but, j„ i. 
iv.  The probability of the event ‘Eik,0, P(Eik,0) = p N " i  ˛ (1,2…N), k ˛ (1,2…Mi) 
when the number of companies in the group G is N.   
   
   We start by keeping the number of companies in the group G (the size of the group) fixed at 
N and allow the board size of each company to vary. Then, given assumptions i -iv, it is clear 
that when the board size of a company  i (i = 1,2…N) is equal to Mi, the company i will be 
interlocked when at least one member of the board of  i also sits on the board of at least 
another company  j  (j  ˛ G but, j  „ i ). D enoting the probability that company  i will be 
interlocked when its board size is Mi by P(Mi), we have 
P(Mi) =  P(the company i is interlocked) 
or, P(Mi) = P (Co_interlock > 0) 
or, P(Mi) = P  [At least one member of the board of i sits on the board of at least another  company j ], 












   If now, the size of the board is increases from  Mi to ( Mi + 1), then the probability that the 
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   From Equation (A.4), it is clear that P(Mi+1) – P (Mi) ‡ 0  and it will be strictly greater than 
zero when pN >> 0 for any company i (i˛G, i=1,2…N). Thus, the probability that company i 
is interlocked is weakly increasing in company  i's board size when the number of companies 
in the group remains fixed. 
   Now, if we allow the group size to vary but keep the board size of the  i
th company fixed at Mi 
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   From equation (A.8), it can be seen that as the size of the business group increases, the 
probability that a member of the board of directors of company i occupies a position on at 
least another company j (j ˛ G, j„ i) also increases. Since the company is interlocked if at 
least one of the members on its board of directors of the company sits on the board of at least 
another company, then as the probability that a board member of the company sits on at least 
another board increases, the probability that the company is interlocked also increases. Thus, 
as group size increases, the probability that a company belonging to the group is interlocked 
also increases. This can be seen more clearly if we differentiate both sides of equation (A.2) 








   From equation (A.9), it is clear that when the probability that a board member sits on at least 
another board increases, the probability that the company being studied is interlocked also 
increases. But, from equation (A.8), it can be seen that the probability that a board member 
sits on at least another board increases with group size. Hence, combining equations (A.8) 
and (A.9), we conclude that the probability that a company i (i = 1,2…N) is interlocked with 
other companies in the group G weakly increases with the size of the group  G when the 
board size of each company remains fixed.  
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